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THE ATROCITY PARADIGM: A THEORY OF EVIL. Claudia Card.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. x + 284 pp.

Claudia Card's book was written before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (preface dated May 2001) and the subsequent politically regrettable return of a polarizing language of "good" and "evil." Nevertheless, it is testimony to this book's richness and insight that it remains timely despite these profound changes in political atmosphere. As I write this review, pictures of Iraqi prisoners abused by US troops cover the front pages of major newspapers worldwide. Card's account of evil lets us think carefully about such atrocities, recognize their moral seriousness and their claim on our attention, yet not fall into the trap of thinking that evil justifies evil, or demonizing the doers of evil deeds. I can think of no better test for a proposed account of evil than that.

As well as offering an account of evil that takes atrocities as paradigm, the book advocates a political agenda for social justice movements that prioritizes eliminating evils over eliminating unjust inequalities, examines two central contemporary evils (rape in war and domestic violence), and concludes with a discussion of responses to evil on the part of its victims, perpetrators, and those who are both at once. This final part of the book is rich in moral psychological observation; I found the discussion of emotional alchemies, including the processes that transform perpetrator's undischARGEABLE guilt into resentment and victim's resentment into guilt at making others feel guilty (206-210), especially illuminating. For the purposes of a review in this journal, though, I will focus on Card's proposed political agenda and on her discussion of terrorism within the home and its implications for the question of lesbian, transgender, and gay marriage. But first, the account of evil.

It is customary to divide evils into two kinds: natural (such as earthquakes) and human (such as war). Card presents us with an account of evil that is moralized twice over, first in its focus on culpable wrongdoing and second in its appeal to a normative notion of intolerable harm:

“an evil is harm that is (1) reasonably foreseeable (or appreciable) and (2) culpably inflicted (or tolerated, aggravated, or maintained), and that (3) deprives, or seriously risks depriving, others of the basics that are necessary to make a life possible and tolerable or decent (or to make a death decent)” (16). Evils are a sub-class of morally wrong acts; thus natural disasters, though they bring harm, do not count as evils. Likewise, harms that are non-culpably inflicted, or insufficiently serious though real and morally unjust, do not count as evils.

There are a number of advantages of this account, which begins from the victim’s perspective. By bringing harm, rather than motive to the front and center of the account, we are able to avoid demonizing perpetrators: “The atrocity paradigm suggests that the energy fueling the hostility in judgments of evil is better channeled into eliminating harms and abolishing evil institutions than into punishing evil doers. For it is the harm, rather than the culpable wrongdoing, that distinguishes evils from other wrongs” (102). By refusing to count all harms as evils, we retain the moral seriousness of the concept and support the special claim that the sufferers of evil have on our moral and political attention. Finally, by requiring that the serious harms be wrongfully inflicted, we head off as spurious a line of thought that recent events reveal as tempting: perhaps some evils are so serious that we have no choice but to respond to them with evil. Perhaps we can torture prisoners if so doing breaks the back of terrorist networks. However, if evils are gravely serious, wrongfully inflicted harms, it follows that a harm that is morally justified cannot be an evil (17-18). For these reasons, I find Card’s account of evil superior to accounts that focus exclusively on culpability or exclusively on harm (chapters 3 & 4) and I take her to have vindicated the ethical importance of the concept of evil against those who would, following Nietzsche, take the focus away from evils and instead offer a debunking diagnosis of the motives of those who bring the charge of evil (chapter 2).

It seems likely that the most controversial sections of the book will be Card’s proposed political agenda of prioritizing evil over inequality (chapter 5) and her working through of the implications of this agenda for marriage and motherhood (chapter 7), so it is to those I turn. Card argues against the now mainstream feminist agenda that advocates equality between the sexes. Her reasons for doing this are not new: given that some men live lives that are barely tolerable because burdened and cramped by racism and poverty, it can hardly be liberatory for women to aspire to equality with such men. Equality feminism presupposes a tacit reference group of middle-class white men and thus predictably fails to attract those who confront multiple oppressions (98-100). Card exca-

vates a more radical strand of feminism that struggles to eliminate oppression and thus focuses on evils such as rape, domestic violence, workplace hazard, and homelessness rather than wage inequality, glass ceilings and university admissions (105). Card is of course aware that exclusions can harm through what they communicate about the social worth of those excluded, and that the harm so produced can amount to an evil, especially but not only where the exclusions or indignities are multiple (104). Nor does she advocate ignoring inequalities; arguing instead for the importance of not settling for even large progress against such inequalities while evils remain unremedied (110-111).

The seriousness of evils, as Card defines them, makes their claim on our attention undeniable. For all that, I worry that the priority thesis may encourage us to overlook the complex causal connections between inequalities and evils. Take the case of domestic violence. Studies indicate that women's participation in paid work is negatively correlated with battery—perhaps because contributing to the family economy improves women's status, perhaps because it is harder for the batterer to employ strategies of isolation when a woman works outside the home. Given that women earn less than men and given the shortage of quality affordable childcare, it will frequently be individually rational for women rather than men to take time out from paid employment for childcare. Not only can this put in place conditions that enable battery, in Australia and elsewhere in the developed world it threatens to impoverish whole generations of old women. In some contexts, evils may be indirectly addressed though addressing those inequalities that, while not evils in themselves, sustain evils.

The priority thesis can recognize that inequalities, where they contribute indirectly to evils, should be given priority insofar as attacking them is a means of attacking evils. Thus this objection is not philosophically deep, but it might be pragmatically important. Below, I'll argue that we may need a more context-sensitive guerrilla politics that pursues a variety of short and long-term objectives and that such a politics may have strong pragmatic reasons for preferring not to sum-up its agenda in the priority thesis.

Card argues that the shocking prevalence of domestic violence—both battery and child sexual abuse—shows that marriage is an evil institution and thus that lesbian, bisexual, gay and transgender liberation groups should not fight for same sex marriage, even though being excluded from such a central social institution is stigmatizing (139-146). Marriage enables violence by providing access to victims and sheltering perpetrators and, even where no-fault divorce exists, marriage creates

the kinds of financial entanglements that make escape difficult. The solution is to deregulate intimate relationships removing state involvement in them (149). To the argument that marriage provides needed stability for raising children, Card replies that motherhood as institution, founded on assigning responsibility for a child's behavior exclusively to one individual, provides rights of access that foster domination and enable abuse (160-165).

Card articulates what I take to be the strongest case against same-sex marriage. She is surely right to point to the need for radical revision in our conception of parenting and to call for more radical experimentation in personal relationships, where she floats the idea of fixed term intimate partnerships, renewable by mutual consent rather than open-ended ones that must terminate by the action of one or both partners (157). Again, however, I worry that given certain social contexts, these proposals may leave those with least social power even worse off. The experience of indigenous Australians is not that marriage provides too much access to their children, but that it provides too little: successive governments thought it acceptable to remove children from Aboriginal parents allegedly for their own good. More recent Australian experience, including a court case where a sperm donor successfully sued for right of access to a biologically related child (ending in the murder-suicide of the mother and infant), shows that given the unregulated status of our relationships and prevailing social assumptions, lesbians will have too little recognition of our parental rights. An institution that typically provides too much recognition may, when accessed by the stigmatized or invisible, provide about the right amount.

These cases and cases like them raise the question of what is to be held constant in assessing institutions and evaluating proposed political agendas. If there was decent affordable childcare, inequality in earning power might not create conditions linked to battery. If lesbian relationships were not stigmatized, the fact that they escape legal regulation might not make our creative ways of parenting always vulnerable to outside inspection and disruption. Same sex marriage may reduce that vulnerability in two ways: by forcing recognition of legal rights and by reducing stigma. The surprising (to me) level of right wing moral panic created at the prospect of same-sex marriage suggests marriage may be so symbolically potent that exclusion from it is sufficiently socially disfiguring to amount to an intolerable harm. The danger, of course, is that more radical social critique and experimentation may be lost in pursuing the "me too" agenda of same-sex marriage.

Card's book is a powerful call not to lose sight of that more radical agenda, not to let evils stand unresisted. However, we might still question her working through of what that agenda implies—because of complex, context dependent, connections between inequalities and evils, we may need a locally targeted guerrilla politics that sometimes focuses on inequalities and that might pursue marriage for the short-term incomplete remedy it offers to some in dire need of immediate relief. And we might be skeptical of agendas set with very broad social contexts in mind—contexts that in virtue of their breadth fall from view as objects of interrogation. What is the context for Card's discussion of marriage? Does it make a difference that reproductive services including anonymous sperm donation are unavailable to single women in many states in Australia when they are available to married women? Does it make a difference that Australia has universal healthcare and immigration rights for same-sex partners, while the USA does not? It seems to me that context can make all the difference to the question of whether or not to pursue same-sex marriage. However, while being skeptical of relatively context-insensitive political agendas, one can nevertheless welcome the reminder not to let one's eyes fall from the main prize: a world in which no-one is forced to live a life below the threshold of decency.

I should have liked the book to offer more discussion of this central normative notion of a "tolerable or decent" life, for it seems to me that it is *this* notion, rather than the notion of an evil as such that is driving Card's argument. If there are sometimes hard choices so that a morally justifiable action can leave someone without the "basics" that are needed for a decent life, what happens to them is not, on Card's account, an evil (and this, I argued, is strength of her account). Yet, of course the fact that their life is now intolerable gives them a claim over what we do *next*. Similarly victims of natural disasters have claims on our response, and sometimes it can be easier to fix a natural disaster than a human one. I take it that Card intends these cases to be covered under the account of evil insofar as, so long as they are remediable, to tolerate them is itself an evil. However, if they don't become evils until tolerated, their being an evil cannot explain their immediate claim on our attention: that's explained by the person's life having fallen below a normative threshold of tolerability. Thus the notion of such a normative threshold is central to the theory, yet where such thresholds lie, what is above, what below, is essentially contested. Further exploration of this normative concept would not only flesh out the theory of evil more fully it would have further substantive theoretical benefits for moral philosophy. Card's book thus points the way towards, and explains the importance of, a further

normative theoretical project. It is also that rare book that can be read by experts in moral philosophy, readers from other disciplines, as well as the elusive “general reader.” And I can think of no better time to read it.

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QUEER GLOBALIZATIONS: CITIZENSHIP AND THE AFTER-LIFE OF COLONIALISM. Arnaldo Cruz-Malave and Martin F. Manalansan IV, eds. *New York: New York University Press 2002, vii +274 pp.*

“Queerness is now global” (1) begins the introduction to this volume. Indeed, it would seem so. Queers on TV, gay marriage, gay refugees, and news of gay marches and activism around the world give the appearance of a global gay phenomenon. *Queer Globalizations . . .* is nothing if not timely, but fortunately it is much more as well. While there are many directions in which an edited volume with this title could go, in this collection we find the majority of contributors interested in how ‘queer’ cultures, identities and practices are developed and intertwined with capitalism and its variant adaptations and mutations around the globe in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

As the editors state in their introduction, a recent trope of globalization discourses is that globalization is seen to, ‘liberate and promote local sexual differences,’ a claim which is predicated on a developmental narrative in which a premodern prepolitical non-Euro-American queerness assumes the burdens of representing itself as ‘gay’ in order to attain political consciousness (p. 5). Such assumptions need to be challenged, and this volume does that well, with differencing disciplinary and thematic frameworks. There is a general divide between chapters that are more oriented towards a feminist ‘cultural studies’ perspective in their theoretical and thematic materials (i.e., using film, novels, or other examples of popular culture to explore questions of sexual and global) vs.

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